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According to the passage, which of the following is NOT an improvement of Finnis’s theory of natural law over Aquinas’s?
a Avoiding the “naturalistic fallacy”
b Removing the necessity of God in his definition of “good”
c Curtailing freedom in human actions
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On the other hand, option (a) "Avoiding the 'naturalistic fallacy'" is mentioned in the passage as an improvement of Finnis's theory. It explains that Finnis avoids the charge of falling into the naturalistic fallacy by asserting that the goods he identifies are not inherently moral, but become moral through human participation in them. This indicates that Finnis has addressed a potential criticism of his theory that Aquinas did not fully address.
I don’t see any indications in the passage that Aquinas’ theory faced the same criticism.
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Finnis avoids the charge that his theory falls into the “naturalistic fallacy” by asserting that these goods are not moral in themselves but become moral through human participation in them.
The charge is specifically in reference to “his theory” (Finnis). While the author seems to be describing improvements of Finnis’ theory over that of Aquinas’ in the first paragraph, how can we jump to a conclusion (that the first paragraph lists only improvements) without taking part in an assumption?
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