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GRE Prep Club's 2022 Full-Time MBA Rankings | |||||||||||
2022 GRE Prep Club RANK | OVERALL SCORE | MBA PROGRAM | PRIOR YEAR GRE Prep Club RANK | RANKING CHANGE | GRE Prep Club vs. USNWR | BRAND VALUE SCORE | BRAND VALUE RANK | COHORT STRENGTH SCORE | COHORT STRENGTH RANK | ROI SCORE | ROI RANK |
1 | 100 | Harvard University (MA) | 1 | 0 | -4 | 100 | 1 | 94.12 | 4 | 84 | 11 |
2 | 96.04 | University of Pennsylvania (Wharton) | 3 | -1 | 0 | 86.99 | 2 | 89.95 | 6 | 92.26 | 8 |
3 | 94.72 | Stanford University (CA) | 2 | +1 | +2 | 85.74 | 3 | 99.98 | 2 | 82.16 | 13 |
4 | 91.92 | Northwestern University (Kellogg) (IL) | 5 | -1 | 0 | 66.05 | 7 | 95.28 | 3 | 100 | 1 |
5 | 88.46 | Columbia University (NY) | 11 | -6 | -2 | 76.36 | 4 | 100 | 1 | 78.36 | 17 |
6 | 86.86 | University of Chicago (Booth) (IL) | 4 | +2 | +3 | 67.03 | 6 | 86.43 | 9 | 95.98 | 6 |
7 | 85.46 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Sloan) | 8 | -1 | +2 | 75.09 | 5 | 84.77 | 10 | 86.41 | 10 |
8 | 82.88 | New York University (Stern) | 7 | +1 | -2 | 55.95 | 11 | 91.18 | 5 | 94.64 | 7 |
9 | 78.77 | University of California--Berkeley (Haas) | 6 | +3 | +2 | 63.38 | 8 | 87.41 | 7 | 81.8 | 14 |
10 | 74.06 | University of Virginia (Darden) | 10 | 0 | -3 | 43.29 | 15 | 80.43 | 11 | 98 | 2 |
11 | 72.09 | Duke University (Fuqua) (NC) | 12 | -1 | -1 | 57.64 | 10 | 60.44 | 23 | 96.65 | 5 |
12 | 71.44 | Dartmouth College (Tuck) (NH) | 14 | -2 | +2 | 38.63 | 18 | 80.42 | 12 | 97.17 | 3 |
13 | 71.39 | Cornell University (Johnson) (NY) | 16 | -3 | -2 | 47.75 | 13 | 69.91 | 18 | 96.96 | 4 |
14 | 69.91 | Yale University (CT) | 9 | +5 | +5 | 45.54 | 14 | 86.96 | 8 | 81.45 | 15 |
15 | 69.25 | University of Michigan--Ann Arbor (Ross) | 13 | +2 | +2 | 57.87 | 9 | 69.86 | 19 | 82.39 | 12 |
16 | 59.81 | University of California--Los Angeles (Anderson) | 15 | +1 | -2 | 51.44 | 12 | 79.9 | 13 | 60.4 | 26 |
17 | 59.78 | Carnegie Mellon University (Tepper) (PA) | 21 | -4 | +1 | 30.6 | 21 | 70.58 | 16 | 89.17 | 9 |
18 | 59.48 | University of Texas--Austin (McCombs) | 17 | +1 | 0 | 42.9 | 16 | 67.69 | 20 | 78.72 | 16 |
19 | 55.63 | University of Southern California (Marshall) | 19 | 0 | +3 | 35.71 | 19 | 77.21 | 15 | 69.67 | 20 |
20 | 50.71 | University of Washington (Foster) | 18 | +2 | -2 | 23.39 | 24 | 79.51 | 14 | 69.7 | 19 |
21 | 44.36 | University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill (Kenan-Flagler) | 23 | -2 | +1 | 38.89 | 17 | 52.91 | 26 | 63.67 | 25 |
22 | 36.81 | Emory University (Goizueta) (GA) | 22 | 0 | -4 | 14.44 | 30 | 59.83 | 24 | 66.33 | 23 |
23 | 36.67 | Rice University (Jones) (TX) | 20 | +3 | -2 | 27.78 | 22 | 42.05 | 34 | 67.95 | 22 |
24 | 32.75 | Vanderbilt University (Owen) (TN) | 28 | -4 | +1 | 15.4 | 28 | 50.79 | 28 | 64.61 | 24 |
25 | 32.6 | Brigham Young University (Marriott) (UT) | 34 | -9 | -6 | 22.75 | 25 | 67.1 | 21 | 42.97 | 34 |
26 | 32.48 | Indiana University (Kelley) | 29 | -3 | +3 | 26.79 | 23 | 46.5 | 30 | 56.33 | 28 |
27 | 32.3 | Georgia Institute of Technology (Scheller) | 24 | +3 | -1 | 6.85 | 38 | 54.21 | 25 | 69.3 | 21 |
28 | 30.95 | Georgetown University (McDonough) (DC) | 25 | +3 | +7 | 7.68 | 36 | 47.79 | 29 | 71.13 | 18 |
29 | 29.72 | University of Minnesota--Twin Cities (Carlson) | 26 | +3 | +1 | 12.04 | 32 | 67.05 | 22 | 47.68 | 32 |
30 | 27.65 | University of Rochester (Simon) (NY) | 27 | +3 | -3 | 18.11 | 27 | 40.16 | 35 | 60.31 | 27 |
31 | 25.75 | Pennsylvania State University--University Park (Smeal) | 33 | -2 | -2 | 19.33 | 26 | 46.25 | 31 | 49.89 | 31 |
32 | 19.94 | Arizona State University (W.P. Carey) | 35 | +2 | 32.69 | 20 | 33.32 | 37 | 35.42 | 36 | |
33 | 17.43 | University of Wisconsin--Madison | 30 | -9 | 12.59 | 31 | 52.25 | 27 | 34.03 | 37 | |
34 | 14.08 | University of Florida (Warrington) | <unranked> | +8 | 14.79 | 29 | 15.59 | 38 | 56.22 | 29 | |
35 | 13.78 | University of Notre Dame (Mendoza) (IN) | 31 | -1 | 8.28 | 35 | 44.15 | 33 | 37.61 | 35 | |
36 | 7.56 | University of California--Davis | <unranked> | -17 | 0 | 40 | 45.21 | 32 | 31.95 | 38 | |
37 | 7.5 | University of California--Irvine (Merage) | 37 | -20 | 10.4 | 33 | 70.2 | 17 | 0 | 40 | |
38 | 3.72 | University of Maryland--College Park (Smith) | 40 | -4 | 2.37 | 39 | 6.2 | 39 | 54.94 | 30 | |
39 | 1.32 | University of Utah (Eccles) | <unranked> | -5 | 6.93 | 37 | 38.95 | 36 | 17.27 | 39 | |
40 | 0 | Ohio State University (Fisher) | 38 | +7 | 8.82 | 34 | 0 | 40 | 46 | 33 |
Last Years’ % Weight to Determine Brand Score | This Years’ % Weight to Determine Brand Score | Description |
66.67% | 50% | Composite score is an algorithm based on three key pieces of raw data, and derivatives and combinations of the same: (i) total number of applicants, (ii) total number of admitted students and (iii) total number of matriculating students in an effort to answer the question: “If a student got into each school they applied to, which one would they be most likely to pick.” We believe our models measure market demand factors and perception factors among other aspiring MBA students. The stronger the market demand for a school, the higher the score. |
16.66% | 16.66% | Composite score measuring whether or not Bain and/or Boston Consulting Group and/or McKinsey have determined students admitted to a school are suitable for pre-MBA internship opportunities; the more companies have approved a program, the higher it’s score; this is intended to serve as a rough measure of prestige among prospective employers. |
16.66% | 16.66% | Composite score measuring the perception of a programs’ strengths by the administration at other schools as compared to the stated desires of MBA students at all programs measured; the more tightly a schools reputation across its’ departments correlates with the desires of the typical MBA student’s academic interests, the higher the schools’ score. By way of providing an example, most MBA students want to improve their abilities in marketing – so, if a school has a highly regarded marketing department they will score higher than a school with a highly regarded real estate department (since only a small number of MBA students are seeking this specific expertise). |
- | 16.66% | Composite score constructed identically to the score immediately above – EXCEPT – it only looks at the strength of the four academic areas most demanded by MBA students (in alphabetical order) – Entrepreneurship, Finance, Management and Marketing. A school scoring higher in this area than the one above would have higher perceived strength in these four main areas vs. weaknesses in the other nine less sought out attributes (Accounting, Business Analytics, Information Systems, International, Non-Profit, Production / Operations, Project Management, Supply Chain / Logistics and Real Estate). To give a sense for why these four areas were selected – they, collectively, represent 62.6% of the total ‘academic areas of interest’ expressed by MBA students (the smallest being Entrepreneurship at 12.5% of the total interest). Of the other nine academic areas combined for 37.4%, and the next closest single area of academic interest was Business Analytics at 6.7% of the demand from MBA students. |
Last Years’ % Weight to Determine ROI Score | This Years’ % Weight to Determine ROI Score | Description |
66.67% | 66.67% | Composite score measuring the published average first year total compensation (signing bonus, salary, other guaranteed bonuses), adjusted downward based on the percentage of the graduating class who does not report their employment details back to the school. Our model is predicated on the belief that graduates who do not report in are either unemployed (but looking for work), unemployed (and no longer looking for work), under-employed (and embarrassed by it), starting their own business (at low initial compensation, and are either embarrassed to report), are working at an unknown start-up (and are potentially embarrassed by the lack of prestige and/or a compensation package they know is lower than others in their cohort). In each instance, these non-reporting students are almost assuredly making less than their peers who did report. Since social norms common among MBA students include a bias against self-reporting below-average information, graduates with low-paying jobs and/or at employers they deem unremarkable are less likely to be reflected in the compensation statistics published by the schools. As a result, in this model, a school reporting higher compensation levels from a higher percentage of their graduating class will score more highly than a school with either lower compensation or a lower percentage of graduates reporting (or both). |
16.66% | 16.66% | Composite score which rewards schools who have graduates who (i) have accepted a job prior to graduation, (ii) have accepted a job prior to 90 days after graduation and (iii) have achieved a high level of compensation in the process. The idea is that graduates would prefer to get a great job that pays well as soon as possible, and the longer they have to wait to achieve this goal, the higher the risk they may not actually achieve it – and since achieving a great, high-paying job after graduation is the primary goal of most MBA students, not achieving the primary goal represents a material aspect of whether or not a school is desirable (when compared to others). |
16.66% | 16.66% | Composite score reflecting the financial costs to attend a school; tuition, books, room, board, fees, etc. Note that this does not include the opportunity cost of attending other schools, pursuing other degrees, forgoing compensation being earned prior to attending school, etc. A lower cost result in higher score; lower costs reduce the risks a student faces of not achieving a great job prior to (or upon) graduation. |
Last Years’ % Weight to Determine ROI Score | This Years’ % Weight to Determine ROI Score | Description |
50% | 50% | Composite score reflecting a schools’ average GMAT score (adjusted based on the percentage of the cohort who has reported their GMAT) and a schools’ average GRE-V and GRE-Q scores (adjusted based on the percentage of the cohort reporting their GRE). In our model, the average GRE scores for all schools reporting their GRE scores were converted to a GMAT equivalent using a widely known and publicly available formula. NOTE: Six schools did not provide GRE scores (Booth, Columbia, Goizueta, Kellogg, Marriott, and Tuck). To incorporate these six schools into this metric, the lowest GMAT:GRE ratio for all other schools in the tier above, the same tier and the tier below each of these six schools was used to fill in the blank. As a result, we understand that it is possible these six schools may be slightly disadvantaged as a result of their own choice to not publish their GRE scores. |
50% | 50% | Composite score reflecting a schools’ average GMAT / GRE score (as discussed above), average GPA, average pre-matriculation work experience, and the relative amount of emphasis a school places on any of those three factors (vs. taking a balanced approach to all three); generally, a school that is consistently above average in each of these three metrics, not favoring one attribute above the others, will score most highly. |
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